Canada's Unlawful Climate Retreat
Canada's New Energy Plan Violates Its Climate Change Law Obligations
The Canadian government recently announced a new energy infrastructure agreement that arguably put its climate change goals in jeopardy. While there has been much debate over the agreement, there has been strangely little discussion of whether it is consistent with Canada’s international law obligations. Whether and how the new program might breach Canada’s climate change obligations should obviously be of considerable importance to Canadians—but the issue may also be of broader interest. Canada is just the latest in a string of Western states apparently backtracking on their climate goals, seemingly oblivious of their legal obligations. Understanding what these obligations are, and how policies such as this new agreement violate them, is profoundly important to the broader response to the climate crisis.
In this post I examine the new energy policy and explain how it likely violates Canada’s climate change obligations—and why that should matter more than the public discourse seems to reflect. To get our arms around the issues I am afraid the post is unfortunately rather long, but for those who want just a quick take, the “Overview & Bottom Line” section should provide a good gist of the facts and argument; and for those who want to get deeper into the weeds, you may just skip the next section and head to the “Background” section.
Overview & Bottom Line
In a nutshell (as most Canadians will know), the federal government and Alberta signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) that envisions a rapid expansion of Alberta’s production of bitumen from its oil sands fields, the development of a new pipeline from Alberta to the Pacific coast for export of the expanded oil production to Asia, and a massive expansion of electrical generation for data centers and new infrastructure. All of this is to be facilitated by a streamlining of the regulatory process, and exempting Alberta from current climate and energy policy regulations, including the carbon pricing standards under the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (the GGPPA), and the federal Clean Energy Regulation enacted under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act. The plan assumes that its impact on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will be offset by a massive carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) project. The entire project is to be privately funded, and it envisions buy-in and involvement of the First Nations.
Critics, including some within the government itself, quickly condemned the project for making the achievement of Canada’s climate goals—particularly its ultimate long-term goal of attaining net-zero by 2050—all but impossible. But there has also been widespread support for the project as being a boon for the Canadian economy. Strangely, it seems to me, there has been little discussion of how the project relates to Canada’s legal obligations. Yet in just the last year there have been several groundbreaking decisions by international tribunals on the obligations of states regarding their response to the climate change crisis, culminating with the Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in Respect to Climate Change from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) just this summer.
The ICJ established that the states have a fundamental obligation, under both treaty and customary international law, not to harm the climate system. This obligation requires that states take increasingly ambitious action to reduce their net GHG emissions, to do their part in achieving the consensus goal of keeping the average global temperature increase to 1.5º Celsius above pre-industrial levels. This is an obligation of conduct, that requires states to act with due diligence in setting and implementing the measures necessary to reduce their GHG emissions. In addition, states have obligations to cooperate with one another in this effort, and they have separate obligations under human rights law to prevent harm to the climate system, which is a precondition to the enjoyment of other fundamental rights.
Canada’s climate plans submitted in accordance with the Paris Agreement, which committed Canada to be net-zero by 2050, were already deemed insufficient to fulfill Canada’s fair share of the reductions required to meet the global 1.5º C objectives, but the MOU arguably now more clearly violates Canada’s climate change obligations. The expansion of bitumen extraction and processing will directly produce an increase in GHG emissions that cannot be completely mitigated by the CCUS project, even if the developing technology for that project is entirely successful. What is more, the expanded energy generation called for will also likely increase emissions. Finally, the relaxation of regulations and the exemptions afforded Alberta will weaken and undermine the Canadian climate change law and policy regime in ways that will further lead indirectly to a reduction in the rate at which GHG emissions are being reduced within Canada.
The adoption of such plans in and of itself constitutes a violation of the due diligence obligations identified by the ICJ. Far from increasing the ambitiousness of its plans to reduce GHG emissions, Canada is, with this MOU, implementing plans that will directly increase GHG emissions, weakening its climate change law and policy regime, and make it virtually impossible to meet its already insufficient targets.
Some may think such obligations abstract and of little matter. But Canada is among the group of Western states that are responsible for creating the bulk of historic GHG emissions, and thus bear disproportionate responsibility for creating this existential crisis for humanity. The obligations identified by the ICJ are owed in large part to the states of the Global South, and the peoples of those states, which are highly vulnerable to the increasingly dire consequences of climate change, and which contributed almost nothing to the causes of this crisis. There is real injustice in failing to do one’s part in resolving a problem that one has helped to cause and which is causing harm to innocent people.
Finally, Canada owes obligations, as a matter of human rights, to the people of Canada—both those currently alive but also those of future generations. We are now on a trajectory of hitting a temperature increase of 3.8º C by 2100, which will be catastrophic for human civilization. Canada must do its fair share to help the world deal with the crisis.
Background
The ICJ Decision & Climate Obligations
In response to a request from the U.N. General Assembly, the ICJ this summer provided an Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in Relation to Climate Change. Specifically, the court answered two questions submitted by the General Assembly, which in short were: (1) what are the obligations of states under the broad corpus of international law to protect the climate system from anthropogenic GHG emissions; and (2) what are the legal consequences arising from a breach of those obligations. After hearings that involved submissions by more countries and intervenors than any case in the court’s history, the ICJ handed down a unanimous opinion that has been generally regarded as momentously significant. Below is a brief overview of the most salient points.
Protecting the Climate System - The Court held that under both the core climate change treaties (the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement, to which Canada is a party), and customary international law, states have a duty to prevent significant harm to the climate system. They must fulfill this duty by acting with due diligence and using all means at their disposal to prevent activities within their jurisdiction or under their control from causing such harm.
This obligation requires states to adopt measures to mitigate GHG emissions, and reducing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere, with a view to achieving the Paris Agreement objective of limiting global warming to 1.5º C above pre-industrial levels. Under the Paris Agreement the states have specific obligations to periodically submit ever more ambitious plans, known as “nationally determined contributions” or NDCs, detailing precisely what measures the states commit taking to reduce emissions.
What is more, the Court held that the developed states that are listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC (which includes Canada) have additional obligations to take the lead in limiting their GHG emissions and taking measures to reduce GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. The court also noted that states have an independent obligation to cooperate with one another in the effort to prevent harm to the climate system, which is essential given that the climate change crisis constitutes a collective action problem that will be impossible to resolve in the absence of cooperation and coordination.
Human Rights Obligations - Finally, the Court recognized that a safe, clean and healthy environment, which includes a safe climate system, is a necessary precondition to the exercise of the most fundamental human rights, such as the right to life and the right to health. States thus have a separate obligation under international human rights law to prevent harm to the climate system. The Court noted that all these duties are erga omnes obligations—that is, obligations owed to all other states and all mankind, not merely to one’s own citizens or any specific country.
Law of State Responsibility - In response to the second question, regarding the consequences of violation, the Court surprised many by holding that the violation of any of these obligations would implicate the full range of legal consequences under the international law of state responsibility. Moreover, a failure to take appropriate action to protect the climate system from the activity of private actors, such as transnational corporations engaged in fossil fuel extraction and production, would constitute an internationally wrongful act attributable to the state, and for which the state would be responsible.
Even more surprising to some, the court dismissed the concerns about causation and attribution that have dogged much of climate change litigation—namely, the problems of determining which precise emissions might be the cause any specific harm—by holding that such issues relate to the determination of remedies rather than the question of violation itself. The obligations were primarily that of conduct rather than result, and thus the violation could be established without proving specific harm. In terms of remedies, however, a violation could give rise to duties to cease the unlawful conduct, make restitution, reparation, or compensation to those harmed, depending on the causal nexus that could be established.
Acceptance of the Science - It should be noted that the Court at the very outset, like the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) before it, confirmed that the periodic reports and analysis by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), along with reports from such UN agencies as the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), provide the “best available science” on climate change.
It accepted the scientific consensus that human activity, primarily anthropogenic GHG emissions, were unequivocally causing a warming climate, which in turn was leading to ever worsening consequences, such as: extreme weather events; changing climatic and weather patterns leading to droughts, food insecurity, and ultimately population displacement; rising sea levels; loss of biodiversity; and increased risks of pandemics, political instability, and armed conflict.
It should be noted that while we have already passed a temperature increase of 1.3º C above pre-industrial levels, projected pathways suggest that a continuation of current policies and actions will lead to an increase of 3.8º C by 2100—an increase which most experts suggest will have catastrophic consequences for human civilization, including the failure of many states and international institutions.
Canada’s Climate Change Record
It is necessary to provide a few words on Canada’s current climate change policy in relation to these obligations, even before the development of the MOU. Canada is a party to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, but withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol on the eve of being in breach of that treaty in 2012. In its first NDC, as required under the Paris Agreement, Canada committed to reduce GHG emissions by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030. It submitted its most recent NDC in February, 2025, which committed to reduce GHG emissions by 45-50% below 2005 levels by 2035, with a long-term goal of being net-zero by 2050.
That last commitment, to be net-zero by 2050, was enshrined into law in the Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act. To meet these targets, the government laid out a sector-by-sector plan, the “2030 Emissions Reduction Plan,” which covers GHG emission reduction targets for electricity, oil and gas, industry, building, waste, agriculture, and nature-based solutions (primarily land use).
As will be examined below, the Canada-Alberta MOU weakens and revises many of the 2030 Emission Reduction Plans’ measures and makes the achievement of its goals highly unlikely. But these goals are themselves insufficient in terms of Canada doing its “fair share” in reducing GHG emissions for the purpose of achieving the Paris Agreement objectives of keeping global warming to 1.5º Celsius. The Climate Action Tracker, a highly regarded platform that tracks national and global policies against the Paris Agreement goals, reports that Canada’s NDC targets in terms of Canada’s “fair share” is “insufficient,” and is actually consistent with a global trajectory towards a relatively catastrophic 3º C increase by 2100. What is more, it determined that based on national policies and action (as opposed to its pledges)—prior to the announcement of the Canada-Alberta MOU—Canada’s climate posture was “highly insufficient” and consistent with a global trajectory of a dystopian 4º C increase by 2100.
The Canada-Alberta MOU
Expanded Production & Increased GHG Emissions – Much of the news of the MOU has focused on the pipeline between Alberta and the coast of British Columbia, but the agreement is much broader and more far reaching than the mere development of another pipeline. The pipeline, which is projected to have a capacity of 1 million barrels a day, is simply a means of distribution for a huge expansion of Alberta’s bitumen extraction, processing, and export industry, to provide increased exports to Asian markets. Moreover, it constitutes a development of fossil fuel export infrastructure that will lock-in increased extraction, processing, and export for years to come.
Bitumen has more than twice the carbon intensity of regular North American crude oil, meaning that the GHGs emitted in the process of extraction and processing (not final combustion) are higher than the emissions from the production of North American crude oil. The increases in volumes anticipated by the MOU project would translate into large increases in carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emissions from Alberta’s oil sands sector. For reasons we will explore below, this will not be entirely offset by the CCUS plan, and thus will almost certainly result in increased GHG emissions overall for Canada.
Relaxed Regulation of Oil & Gas - In addition to this direct increase in GHG emissions from the increased production of bitumen, other aspects of the plan will also likely have significant indirect consequences for Canada’s climate change goals—including the relaxation of laws and regulations referred to earlier.
In particular, the MOU contemplates the establishment of both a carbon pricing equivalent agreement and a methane equivalency agreement. This involves an abandonment of the federal government’s planned direct regulation of Alberta’s oil and gas sector emissions, which would have required a net-zero industry by 2050, and substituting in its place a provincial carbon pricing and regulation regime that will be more relaxed. Indeed, one explicit feature of this will delay for five years the scheduled imposition of reduction limits on methane, one of the most potent greenhouse gases.
Electrical Generation Industry - Similarly, the MOU contemplates exempting Alberta from the federal government’s Clean Electricity Regulation (CER), enacted under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act. This regulation was designed to cap and progressively restrict GHG emissions from fossil-fuel electricity generation, with binding limits projected to come into force in 2035, and to result in a net-zero electrical generation system by 2050. This was considered a core element of Canada’s climate change policy, and essential to achieving the goal of a net-zero economy by 2050. Providing Alberta with an exemption to that regime, to be replaced by a yet-to-be negotiated industrial pricing agreement under an Albertan emissions reduction program, will likely lead to other Provinces seeking similar relief, and an overall weakening of the national regime. The overall impact of this is expected to undermine Canada’s ability to reach either of its net-zero goals by 2050.
While the MOU thus contemplates a weakening of regulation of the carbon intensity of the electrical generation industry in Alberta, it also projects a huge expansion in electrical generation, both in Alberta and nationwide. The MOU calls for the development of a policy framework to incentivize large investments in data center development and “Canadian sovereign computing.” Proponents view this as a foundation for Alberta to become a major energy supplier for energy-intensive industries nationwide. The MOU does not mandate that the additional power generation be driven by clean energy, and at least some part of this expansion in power generation will no doubt be fueled by fossil fuels, including most obviously Albertan bitumen and gas.
The CCUS Offset - Finally, all the increased GHG emissions that the foregoing will surely entail, is to be offset by the development of a major carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) project to be developed by Pathways Alliance, “for the purpose of making Alberta oil among the lowest carbon intensity produced barrels of oil in the world.” Indeed, the MOU contemplates the pipeline and oil sands expansion to be contingent upon the development of the CCUS project, which is to be facilitated by federal tax incentives and private investment. But while both the technology and markets for an increased production of bitumen already exists, the technology required for the carbon capture and storage at the scale contemplated is very much speculative—and as will be discussed below, even if it is developed exactly as contemplated, current projections suggest that the CCUS could not entirely offset the increased GHG emissions.
There are of course other aspects of the MOU that have attracted considerable criticism—such as the relaxation of current limitations on oil tankers in the northern waters of B.C., over the objections of First Nations, and the weakening of legislation on greenwashing—but I will limit the analysis here to more direct implications for Canada’s climate change obligations.
Analysis
The Climate Change Impacts of the MOU - The MOU is just a broad-strokes agreement, and much of the detail is still to be determined—and thus there remains quite a bit of uncertainty regarding the likely consequences, both in terms of direct results and second and third order effects. Nonetheless, in my view it can be said with some confidence that aspects of this plan are entirely inconsistent with Canada’s international legal obligations. Indeed, one could argue that the very negotiation and conclusion of the MOU, even before any steps are taken towards its implementation, constitute violations of Canada’s obligations under both treaty (the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement) and customary international law.
First and foremost, the plan contemplated by the MOU will, with virtual certainty, result in a direct increase in Canada’s GHG emissions. The extraction and processing of bitumen prior to export will result in GHG emissions in the order of 57 Kg CO2e per barrel on average, if we assume the best currently available and emerging technologies for reducing its carbon intensity. At one million additional barrels a day under the MOU, that translates into an increase of GHG emissions of 20.8 Mt CO2e per year—and that is just the direct increase from the oil production itself.
Based on Canada’s current GHG emissions—which, of course, Canada has a legal obligation to reduce—that would comprise an approximate 3% increase in annual GHG emissions. Some other analyses have put the numbers higher, at 28.9 Mt CO2e, or closer to a 4% increase. All of that will be additional to an already increasing rate of GHG emissions from Alberta’s oil sands, which comprises a significant percentage of all Canadian GHG emissions (10-12% in recent years according to government reporting).
The CCUS would not be capable of entirely offsetting this increase projected under the MOU, even if all the assumed and somewhat speculative technological developments pan out as hoped. While there has been a reduction of the carbon intensity of bitumen over the years, due to improvements in technology, a peer-reviewed analysis of emerging technologies in the Canadian oil and gas sector predicts that emerging extractive technology could lower upstream emissions (i.e. the GHG emissions from extraction and processing, not consumption) by only another 20 Kg CO2e/bbl. But that is considered ambitious and technologically uncertain—and that still equates to some 37 Kg CO2e/bbl. At one million additional barrels a day contemplated by the MOU, that means an additional 13.5 Mt CO2e per year at the very best.
The CCUS plan, however, is reported to be aiming for capture and storage of only 4.2 Mt CO2e per year by 2030 (though some sources suggest as high as 10-12 Mt CO2e per year), increasing over time to a maximum of 62 Mt CO2 per year by 2050. And it is also acknowledged that the CCUS plan simply cannot capture emissions from all aspects of the production process. Thus, even with decreasing carbon intensity and increasing carbon capture, this all leaves a significant “net zero gap” for many years beyond 2030, even if all the speculative technological advances pan out perfectly, and if it is possible to scale the CCUS project as quickly as it is possible to expand bitumen production.
Now, to be clear, some of these numbers are still rough estimates—albeit developed by experts, based in part on preliminary information—but the bottom line is that it appears almost certain that the expansion will result in an increase in net GHG emissions. This is no doubt why the MOU itself includes the replacement of the federal regulation of Alberta’s tar sands industry, which had mandated that it achieve net-zero by 2050, with a provincial pricing scheme that will be more relaxed.
The plan in the MOU, therefore, contemplates a direct increase in GHG emissions strictly from the process of expanding bitumen extraction and processing. Added to this will be the likely increases in GHG emissions resulting from the increased energy production contemplated, and the relaxation of the various regulatory regimes that the MOU proposes. Many critiques predict that other provinces will very likely seek their own exemptions from the Clean Energy Regulation, thus further weakening and undermining a regime that is central to Canada’s plans for meeting its climate change objectives.
What is more, the MOU provides for exemptions to permit Alberta to establish its own carbon pricing regime, which will not be required to meet or exceed the federal “minimum national stringency standards” as required under the federal Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (GHGPPA). That will likely erode the crucial concept of a minimum national carbon pricing standard—which will in turn create uncertainty, regulatory fragmentation, and instability in the carbon markets, all of which will mean a slowing in the rate of reduction of GHG emissions nationwide.
The MOU’s Violations of Climate Obligations - All of the foregoing can be boiled down to this: the government of Canada entered into an agreement with Alberta that will clearly increase GHG emissions, and relax legislation and regulation designed to reduce GHG emissions, making it far less likely that it can possibly achieve its climate change policy objectives. That quite clearly violates the obligations of due diligence that the ICJ identified as being at the heart of the fundamental obligation to protect the climate system. Canada’s policies were already insufficient to fulfill Canada’s part in achieving the 1.5º C objective under the Paris Agreement, as noted earlier, but now Canada is effectively lowering its own objectives.
The ICJ stressed that in the preparation of climate change plans, for purposes of submitting their NDCs in accordance with their obligations under the Paris Agreement, states have limited discretion (para. 246):
parties are obliged to exercise due diligence and ensure that their NDCs fulfil their obligations under the Paris Agreement and thus, when taken together, are capable of achieving the temperature goal of limiting global warming to 1.5º C above pre-industrial levels...” ... “because of the seriousness of the threat posed by climate change, the standard of due diligence to be applied in preparing the NDCs is stringent...This means that each party has to do its upmost to ensure that the NDCs it puts forward represent its highest possible ambition in order to realize the objectives of the Agreement.
What is more, states have an affirmative obligation to implement those increasingly ambitious plans—and that obligation too is one of conduct, which requires parties “to act with due diligence in taking necessary measures to take domestic mitigation measures,” . . . “including in relation to activities carried out by private actors.” (para. 252). The Court stressed that this standard of due diligence is “stringent” because of “the fact that the best available science indicates that the ‘risks and projected adverse impacts and related losses and damage from climate change escalate with every increment of global warming.’” (para. 254). Canada’s NDC was already insufficient, but the MOU makes it likely impossible for Canada to even fulfill its NDC.
In discussing the obligation to prevent harm to the climate system arising from customary international law (as opposed to the climate change treaties) the Court again noted that the due diligence standard required that states must “regulate the conduct of public and private operators with the State’s jurisdiction or control and be accompanied by effective enforcement and monitoring mechanisms to ensure their implementation.” (para. 282)
The MOU, with its contemplation of increased GHG emissions, and relaxation of legislation and regulation that was established to help achieve Canada’s climate change goals, arguably constitutes a clear violation of these obligations. And they are violations now. One does not have to await the realization of increased GHG emission to establish a breach of obligation, as the agreement itself is a violation of the due diligence requirements. As the Court further held, in considering the consequences of violation (para. 427):
Failure of a State to take appropriate action to protect the climate from GHG emissions—including through fossil fuel production, fossil fuel consumption, the granting of fossil fuel exploration licences or the provision of fossil fuel subsidies—may constitute an internationally wrongful act which is attributable to the state. The Court also emphasizes that the internationally wrongful act in question is not the emission of GHGs per se, but the breach of the conventional and customary obligations...pertaining to the protection of the climate system from significant harm...
Obligations to Whom? - It is worth pausing to consider to whom Canada owes these obligations, and who is being harmed by their violation. For some readers there may be an element of abstractness to the discussion of the law thus far, and a tendency to discount the importance of these obligations. But to be clear, Canada owes these obligation to other countries, and through them the peoples of those other countries, not to cause them harm by contributing further to the climate change crisis.
This is where the concept of climate justice becomes important. The developed Western states, including Canada, are largely responsible for the vast majority of historic GHG emissions, and thus for creating the problem of climate change. The peoples of the developing world are far more vulnerable to the increasingly negative consequences of climate change, and yet they are the least responsible for causing the problem. They are calling upon the developed world to help solve the problem, and to provide financial support for them to adapt to the consequences. This is why the ICJ held that Annex I countries have a particular obligation to engage in ambitious mitigation and to prevent further harm to the climate.
Moreover, Canada owes obligations to its own people, both those here today, especially younger Canadians, but also to those who will come hereafter. The Court held that states have independent obligations under international human rights law to protect the climate system, since a clean and safe environment is a precondition for all other rights. Constitutional courts in The Netherlands (Urgenda v. Netherlands) and Germany Neubauer v. Germany), among others, have held that the government lowering of national climate change goals and weakening climate change regulation constitutes a violation of those human rights obligations, including the right to life.
The German Constitutional court went further, and held that the government’s lowering of GHG reduction targets constituted an effective transfer of climate risk to younger and later generations that violated their right to equality, and gave rise to intergenerational inequity. In the case of Mathur v. Ontario similar issues are currently being litigated before the Canadian courts.
One final point is worth noting. Canada is only legally responsible for the GHG emissions created within Canada. Thus, it is responsible for the “upstream” emissions created by the extraction, processing and distribution of the oil and gas from Alberta, as well as any emissions from the consumption of that oil and gas within Canada (known as “scope 3” or “downstream emissions). The scope 3 emissions caused by the consumption of the oil and gas which Canada exports overseas is not part of Canada’s formal GHG emissions for which it is legally responsible—they count towards the GHG emissions of the countries in which they are consumed. Yet from a moral and ethical standpoint, by expanding our exports of oil and gas we are most certainly contributing to the world’s ongoing addiction to fossil fuels and slowing the transition to clean energy, thereby undermining the global effort to confront the crisis.
The reality is that Canada’s climate change record is poor. Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol on the eve of violating its obligations in 2012. At several Conferences of the Parties (COPs) under the UNFCCC, it has been among the small group of petro states that worked to block efforts to include language on the phasing out of fossil fuels. Its efforts towards reducing GHG emissions under the Paris Agreement have been insufficient. Canada’s per capita GHG emissions are among the very highest in the world. Yet there is a strong sense in the public discourse that given the size of our population and economy, we do not really have to do that much, and that it is really for the large states like China and the US to carry the load.
But the ICJ and other courts and tribunals have all made crystal clear that this is a global crisis, involving an intractable collective action problem, and that every country must do its fair share. Canada is clearly not doing its share, and with this MOU, it is further weakening its efforts to help the international community in confronting what is the greatest challenge humanity has ever faced. It is fitting to end with a few words from the final appeal of the Court itself:
The questions posed by the General Assembly represent more than a legal problem: they concern the existential problem of planetary proportions that imperils all forms of life and the very health of our planet. International law, whose authority has been invoked to by the General Assembly, has an important but ultimately limited role in resolving this problem. A complete solution to this daunting, and self-inflicted, problem requires the contributions of all fields of human knowledge, whether law, science, economics, or any other. Above all, a lasting and satisfactory solution requires human will and wisdom—at the individual, social and political levels—to change our habits, comforts and current way of life in order to secure a future for ourselves and those who are yet to come.
It is surely time for Canadians to demand that the Canadian government live up to Canada’s responsibilities, and that we do our part in meeting this global crisis.